Kitobni o'qish: «The True Story of my Parliamentary Struggle»
THE TRUE STORY OF MY PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE
So much misapprehension and misrepresentation prevails as to what has really taken place in the House of Commons with reference to my Parliamentary struggle, that I reprint the Report of the Second Select Committee and the Evidence taken before such Committee, together with my three speeches at the bar and the resolutions of the House: these together giving the actual facts.
Ordered, – [Tuesday, 25th May 1880]: – That Mr. Bradlaugh, the Member for Northampton, having claimed at the Table of this House to make an Affirmation or Declaration instead of the Oath prescribed by Law, founding his claim upon the terms of the Act 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and the Evidence Amendment Acts of 1869 and 1870, and stating that he had been permitted to affirm in Courts of Justice by virtue of the said Evidence Amendment Acts: And it having been referred to a Select Committee to consider and report their opinion whether persons entitled, under the provisions of the Evidence Amendment Act, 1869, and the Evidence Amendment Act, 1870, to make a solemn Declaration instead of an Oath in Courts of Justice, may be admitted to make an Affirmation or Declaration instead of an Oath in this House, in pursuance of the Acts 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and 31 & 32 Vict. c. 72; And the said Committee having reported that in their opinion such persons cannot be admitted to make an Affirmation or Declaration, instead of an Oath in pursuance of the said Acts:
And Mr. Bradlaugh having since come to the Table of the House for the purpose of taking the Oath prescribed by the 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and the 31 & 32 Vict. c. 72, and objection having been made to his taking the said Oath, it be referred to a Select Committee to inquire into and consider the facts and circumstances under which Mr. Bradlaugh claims to have the Oath prescribed by the 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and 31 & 32 Vict. c. 72, administered to him in this House, and also as to the Law applicable to such claim under such circumstances, and as to the right and jurisdiction of this House to refuse to allow the said form of the Oath to be administered to him, and to report thereon to the House, together with their opinion thereon.
Ordered, – [Friday, 28th May 1880]: – That the Committee do consist of twenty-three Members.
Committee nominated of —
Mr. Whitbread.
Sir John Holker.
Mr. John Bright.
Lord Henry Lennox.
Mr. Massey.
Mr. Staveley Hill.
Sir Henry Jackson.
Mr. Attorney General.
Mr. Solicitor General.
Sir Gabriel Goldney.
Mr. Grantham.
Mr. Pemberton.
Mr. Watkin Williams.
Mr. Walpole.
Mr. Hopwood.
Mr. Beresford Hope.
Major Nolan.
Mr. Chaplin.
Mr. Serjeant Simon.
Mr. Secretary Childers.
Mr. Trevelyan.
Sir Richard Cross.
Mr. Gibson.
That the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.
That Five be the Quorum of the Committee.
REPORT
THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to inquire into and consider the facts and circumstances under which Mr. Bradlaugh claims to have the Oath prescribed by the 29 & 30 Vict., c. 19, and 31 and 32 Vict., c. 72, administered to him in this House; and also as to the Law applicable to such claim under such circumstances; and as to the right and jurisdiction of this House to refuse to allow the said form of the Oath to be administered to him; and to Report thereon to the House, together with their Opinion thereon: – Have agreed to the following REPORT: —
In pursuance of the terms of the reference to your Committee, they have inquired into and considered (1) the facts and circumstances under which Mr. Bradlaugh claims to have the oath prescribed by the Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866, and the Promissory Oaths Act, 1868, administered to him in the House, (2) the Law applicable to such claim under such circumstances, and (3) the right and jurisdiction of the House to refuse to allow the form of the said Oath to be administered to him.
In order to carry out such inquiry and consideration, your Committee thought it right to examine Sir T. Erskine May as a witness before them. Mr. Bradlaugh applied to be permitted to make a statement to your Committee, and the application was granted. After such statement had been made by Mr. Bradlaugh, he submitted himself for examination, and was examined by any Members of your Committee who desired to put questions to him. Under the circumstances appearing in the Evidence and in the Appendix to this Report, your Committee admitted in evidence a letter written by Mr. Bradlaugh to certain newspapers, dated 20th May, 1880. All the evidence taken by your Committee appears in the Appendix to this Report.
Facts of the Case
The facts and circumstances under which Mr. Bradlaugh claimed to take and subscribe the Oath are as follow: On Monday, the 3rd of May, Mr. Bradlaugh came to the Table of the House and claimed to be allowed to affirm, as a person for the time being by law permitted to make a solemn affirmation instead of taking an oath; and on being asked by the Clerk upon what grounds he claimed to make an affirmation, he said that he did so by virtue of the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870. Whereupon Mr. Speaker informed Mr. Bradlaugh, “that if he desired to address the House in explanation of his claim, he might be permitted to do so.” In accordance with Mr. Speaker’s intimation, Mr. Bradlaugh stated shortly that he relied on the Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869, and the Evidence Amendment Act, 1870, adding, “I have repeatedly, for nine years past, made an affirmation in the highest courts of jurisdiction in this realm; I am ready to make such a declaration or affirmation.” Thereupon Mr. Speaker acquainted the House that Mr. Bradlaugh having made such claim, he did not consider himself justified in determining it; and having grave doubts on the construction of the Acts above stated, he desired to refer the matter to the judgment of the House. Thereupon a Select Committee was appointed to consider and report their opinion whether persons entitled, under the provisions of the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870, to make a solemn declaration instead of an oath in courts of justice, might be admitted to make an affirmation or declaration instead of an oath, in pursuance of the Acts 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and 31 & 32 Vict. c. 72; and on the 20th of May the Committee reported that, in their opinion, persons so entitled could not be admitted to make such affirmation or declaration instead of an oath in the House of Commons.
On the day after the receipt of this Report, Mr. Bradlaugh presented himself at the table of the House to take and subscribe the Oath; and was proceeding to do so, when Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, one of the Members for Portsmouth, objected thereto, and Mr. Bradlaugh having been ordered to withdraw, Sir H. D. Wolff moved, “That, in the opinion of the House, Mr. Bradlaugh, the Member for Northampton, ought not to be allowed to take the Oath which he then required to be administered to him, in consequence of his having previously claimed to make an affirmation or declaration instead of the Oath prescribed by law, founding his claim upon the terms of the Act 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, and the Evidence Amendment Acts of 1869 and 1870; and on the ground that under the provisions of those Acts the presiding judge at a trial has been satisfied that the taking of an oath would have no binding effects on his conscience.” This Motion was superseded by an Amendment appointing your Committee.
The Law Applicable to Mr. Bradlaugh’s Claim
Your Committee have been furnished by Sir T. Erskine May with a list of precedents which illustrate the jurisdiction and proceedings of the House in regard to the taking of Oaths. These precedents, and others which Mr. Bradlaugh placed before your Committee as bearing on the case, will be found in the Appendix to this Report. They may generally be divided into three classes: first, cases of refusal to take the Oath; secondly, claims to make an Affirmation, instead of taking the Oath; and, thirdly, claims to omit a portion of the Oath of Abjuration. Among them there is no precedent of any Member coming to the table to take and subscribe the Oath, who has not been allowed to do so, nor of any Member coming to the table and intimating expressly, or by necessary implication, that an oath would not, as an oath, be binding on his conscience. The present case is, therefore, one of first impression.
Now there is not only a prima facie right, but it is the duty of every Member who has been duly elected to take and subscribe the Oath, or to affirm according to the Statute. No instance has been brought to the attention of your Committee in which any inquiry has been made into the moral, religious, or political opinion of the person who was desirous to take any Promissory Oath, or of any objection being made to his taking such Oath. It would be impossible to foresee the evils which might arise if a contrary practice were sanctioned. But the question remains whether, if a Member when about to take the Oath should voluntarily make statements as to the binding effect of the Oath on his conscience, it is not within the power of the House to take such statements into consideration, and determine whether such member would, if he went through the form of taking the Oath, be duly taking it within the provisions of the Statute. In the present instance, when Mr. Bradlaugh claimed under the Parliamentary Oaths Acts his right to affirm, and also stated that he had on several occasions been permitted in a Court of Justice to affirm, and had affirmed under the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870, he thereby in effect informed the House that on such occasions a judge of such court had been satisfied that an oath would have no binding effect upon his conscience. Your Committee did not think it right to accept this implication as conclusive without permitting Mr. Bradlaugh an opportunity of making a statement to, and giving evidence before, them. Nothing that has come before your Committee has affected or altered their views as to the effect of that which occurred when Mr. Bradlaugh claimed to affirm, as above stated.
As to the Right and Jurisdiction of the House
As to the right and jurisdiction of the House to refuse to allow the form of the Oath prescribed to be taken by duly elected Members to be taken by them, your Committee are of opinion that there is and must be an inherent power in the House to require that the law by which the proceedings of the House and of its Members in reference to the taking of the Parliamentary Oath is regulated, be duly observed. But this does not imply that there is any power in the House to interrogate any Member desirous to take the Oath of Allegiance upon any subject in connection with his religious belief, or as to the extent the Oath will bind his conscience; or that there is any power in the House to hear any evidence in relation to such matters.
And your Committee are of opinion that by and in making the claim to affirm, Mr. Bradlaugh voluntarily brought to the notice of the House that on several occasions he had been permitted in a Court of Justice to affirm, under the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870, in order to enable him to do which a Judge of the Court must have been satisfied that an Oath was not binding upon Mr. Bradlaugh’s conscience; and, as he stated he had acted upon such decisions by repeatedly making the Affirmation in Courts of Justice; and, as above stated, nothing has appeared before your Committee to cause them to think Mr. Bradlaugh dissented from the correctness of such decisions, your Committee are of opinion that, under the circumstances, the compliance by Mr. Bradlaugh with the form used when an oath is taken would not be the taking of an Oath within the true meaning of the Statutes 29 Vict. c. 19. and 31 & 32 Vict. c. 72; and, therefore, that the House can, and in the opinion of your Committee ought, to prevent Mr. Bradlaugh going through this form.
But your Committee desire to point out to your Honorable House the position in which Mr. Bradlaugh will be placed if he is not allowed either to take the Oath or to affirm.
If the House of Commons prevent a duly elected Member from taking the Oath or Affirming, there is no power of reviewing or reversing that decision, however erroneous it may be in point of law.
But it appears to your Committee that if a Member should make and subscribe the Affirmation in place of taking and subscribing the Oath, it would be possible, by means of an action brought in the High Court of Justice, to test his legal right to make such Affirmation.
The Committee appointed to inquire into the law relating to the right of certain persons to affirm in effect recorded that Mr. Bradlaugh was not entitled by law to make the Affirmation.
But, from the fact that this Report was carried by the vote of the Chairman, thus showing a great division of opinion amongst the members of that Committee, the state of the law upon the subject cannot be regarded as satisfactorily determined. Under these circumstances it appears to your Committee that Mr. Bradlaugh should have an opportunity of having his statutory rights determined beyond doubt by being allowed to take the only step by which the legality of his making an Affirmation can be brought for decision before the High Court of Justice.
The House, by an exercise of its powers, can, doubtless, prevent Mr. Bradlaugh from obtaining such judicial decision; but your Committee deprecate that course.
Your Committee accordingly recommend that should Mr. Bradlaugh again seek to make and subscribe the Affirmation he be not prevented from so doing.
16 June, 1880.
LIST OF WITNESSES
Wednesday, 2nd June, 1880
Sir THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, K.C.B
Mr. CHARLES BRADLAUGH, M.P
Monday, 7th June, 1880
Mr. CHARLES BRADLAUGH, M.P
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE
Wednesday, 2nd June, 1880
MEMBERS PRESENT:
Mr. Attorney General.
Mr. John Bright.
Mr. Childers.
Sir Richard Cross.
Mr. Gibson.
Sir Gabriel Goldney.
Mr. Grantham.
Mr. Staveley Hill.
Sir John Holker.
Mr. Beresford Hope.
Mr. Hopwood.
Sir Henry Jackson.
Lord Henry Lennox.
Mr. Massey.
Major Nolan.
Mr. Pemberton.
Mr. Serjeant Simon.
Mr. Solicitor General.
Mr. Trevelyan.
Mr. Walpole.
Mr. Whitbread.
Mr. Watkin Williams.
The Right Honorable Spencer Horatio Walpole in the Chair
Sir Thomas Erskine May, K.C.B.; Examined
1. Chairman: You are the Clerk of the House of Commons? – I am.
2. You, I believe, are perfectly acquainted with what took place when Mr. Bradlaugh came to the table of the House, and proposed to make his affirmation instead of taking the oath? – Yes, I was personally present on that day.
3. Will you have the kindness to state to the Committee exactly what took place on that occasion, in order that we may have the facts upon our proceedings? – I will read what occurred, mainly from the Votes and Proceedings of the House, in which an accurate and authentic record of the proceedings of that day will be found. It appears that on Monday the 3rd of May, 1880, “Mr. Bradlaugh, returned as one of the Members for the borough of Northampton, came to the table and delivered the following statement in writing to the Clerk: ‘To the Right Honorable the Speaker of the House of Commons. I, the undersigned Charles Bradlaugh, beg respectfully to claim to be allowed to affirm, as a person for the time being by law permitted to make a solemn affirmation or declaration, instead of taking an oath. (Signed) Charles Bradlaugh.’ And being asked by the Clerk upon what grounds he claimed to make an affirmation, he answered: By virtue of the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870. Whereupon the Clerk reported to Mr. Speaker, that Mr. Bradlaugh, Member for the borough of Northampton, claimed to make an affirmation or declaration instead of taking the Oath prescribed by law, in virtue of the provisions of the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870. Mr. Speaker thereupon informed Mr. Bradlaugh that if he desired to address the House in explanation of his claim he might be permitted to do so. Mr. Bradlaugh addressed the House in accordance with Mr. Speaker’s intimation, and then he was directed to withdraw.” The Committee will observe that there is no entry in the Votes of the words used by Mr. Bradlaugh; it is not customary on such occasions to make an entry of the observations made, which are considered to be part of the debates of the House, which are not recorded in the Votes and Proceedings; and there was no shorthand writer authorised by the House to take notes, and therefore there could have been no authentic record upon which one could rely.
4. Have you any reason to believe that something was said upon that occasion by Mr. Bradlaugh other than what appeared upon the Votes? – Mr. Bradlaugh’s observations were very short. He repeated that he relied upon the Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869, and the Evidence Amendment Act, 1870, adding, “I have repeatedly, for nine years past, made an affirmation in the highest courts of jurisdiction in this realm; I am ready to make such a declaration or affirmation.” Substantially those were the words which he addressed to the Speaker.
5. What took place after that? – Whereupon Mr. Speaker addressed the House as follows: “I have now formally to acquaint the House that Mr. Bradlaugh, Member for the borough of Northampton, claims to make an affirmation or declaration instead of the oath prescribed by law. He founds this claim upon the terms of the 4th clause of the Act 29 and 30 Vict., c. 19, and the Evidence Amendment Acts, 1869 and 1870. I have not considered myself justified in determining this claim myself, having grave doubts on the construction of the Acts above stated, but desire to refer the matter to the judgment of the House.”
6. That is substantially all that took place upon that occasion? – I presume the Committee will scarcely desire that I should proceed through all the subsequent Votes of the House in regard to the appointment of the Committees.
7. There is nothing beyond what you have stated which is material for the Committee to consider? – No, nothing besides what happened on that day in reference to this matter.
8. You are, of course, acquainted with the terms of the reference to this Committee. – Yes.
9. What were the proceedings which took place after the Report of the former Committee? – The Report of the Committee was ordered to lie upon the table, and no further proceedings were taken upon it; it lies upon the table at present.
10. Mr. Gibson: On what day was it laid upon the table? – On the 20th of May, the day on which the House assembled for business.
11. Mr. Attorney General: I think some of the members of the Committee would like to have some account of what took place in the interval between the time when Mr. Bradlaugh claimed to make the affirmation, and the time when he appeared at the table to take the Oath? – Mr. Bradlaugh presented himself at the table to be sworn on the 21st of May, the day after the receipt of the Report from the Committee; and if the Committee would desire it, I can read from the Minutes what took place upon that occasion. “Mr. Bradlaugh, returned as one of the Members for the borough of Northampton, came to the table to take and subscribe the Oath, and the Clerk was proceeding to administer the same to him, when Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, Member for Portsmouth, rose to take objection thereto, and submit a motion to the House; whereupon Mr. Speaker directed Mr. Bradlaugh to withdraw.” And then, as the Committee are aware, several proceedings occurred, which extended over some days: the Committee will scarcely desire them to be read.
12. Chairman: Those proceedings are really stated in the Order of Reference to this Committee? – Yes.
13. Mr. Gibson: At what date did this Parliament meet for the first time? – On Thursday, the 29th of April.
14. And on what day did Mr. Bradlaugh claim to make the affirmation? – On Monday, the 3rd of May.
15. The swearing of Members had been going on in the meantime, had it not? – The swearing of Members began on Friday, the 30th of April.
16. You are acquainted with Mr. Bradlaugh’s appearance; are you yourself aware whether he had been in the House during the swearing of Members on any of the intervening days? – He had been about the House, unquestionably.
17. Mr. Serjeant Simon: Mr. Bradlaugh was present, I believe, and voted when the Speaker was elected? – Yes; none of the members had then been sworn.
18. Chairman: Since this Committee has been appointed have you made a search into the Journals of the House for any precedents which bear upon the question before the Committee? – Yes, I directed the Clerk of the Journals to make a search for every precedent which would tend to illustrate the jurisdiction and proceedings of the House in regard to the taking of oaths.
19. What is the result of the search? – The result of that search is the paper which is upon the table to-day, and in the hands of all the Members of the Committee.
20. I see that one of those is a precedent of a Member disabled for having sat in the House without taking the Oath; then there is a precedent of a Member being admitted to sit without taking the Oath of Allegiance and Supremacy; then there are precedents of Members being discharged for declining to take the Oath; then there is a precedent of a Member, being a Quaker, refusing to take the Oath; then there is a precedent of a Member expelled for absconding, and not taking the Oath; then there is a precedent of a Member refusing to take the Oath of Supremacy; then there is a precedent of a Member, being a Quaker, claiming to make an affirmation; then there are precedents of Members omitting the words in the Oath of Abjuration, “on the true faith of a Christian;” and lastly, the precedent of a Member stating that he had a conscientious objection to take the Oath. I should like to ask whether there is any precedent amongst those of a member coming to the table and stating that he was ready to take the Oath, and any objection being taken to him in consequence of that statement? – No, there is no precedent to that effect, unless it might be argued that the case of Mr. O’Connell, in 1829, was, to a certain extent, analogous. He claimed, as the Committee are aware, to take the Oath recently provided by the Catholic Relief Act, and which, he contended, was the oath that he was entitled to take; it was a question of law whether that was the oath which he could take.
21. In that case he refused to take the old oath, and he offered to take the new oath under the Catholic Relief Act? – That is so.
22. And the House refused, I believe, to allow him to take that oath? – That was the case. I may state briefly that these precedents may generally be divided into three classes: first, cases of refusal to take the oath; secondly, claims to make an affirmation instead of taking the oath; and thirdly, claims to omit a portion of the Oath of Abjuration. With one or two exceptional cases, those three classes comprehend all the cases which have been laid before the Committee.
23. Mr. Bradlaugh (through the Committee): I should like to ask upon that whether the case of Daniel O’Connell was not a case of absolute refusal by the Member to take the oath required by law? – I think the best way will be, perhaps, to read the precedent from this paper, and then any inference can be drawn from it. It is at page 5. “Precedent of Member refusing to take the Oath of Supremacy; Daniel O’Connell, Esq., professing the Roman Catholic religion, returned knight of the shire for the county of Clare, being introduced in the usual manner, for the purpose of taking his seat, produced at the table a certificate of his having been sworn before two of the deputies appointed by the Lord Stewart, whereupon the Clerk tendered to him the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration; upon which Mr. O’Connell stated that he was ready to take the Oaths of Allegiance and Abjuration, but that he could not take the Oath of Supremacy, and claimed the privilege of being allowed to take the oath set forth in the Act passed in the present Session of Parliament ‘for the relief of His Majesty’s Roman Catholic subjects’; whereupon the Clerk having stated the matter to Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker informed Mr. O’Connell that, according to his interpretation of the law, it was incumbent upon Mr. O’Connell to take the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy and Abjuration, and that the provisions of the new act applied only to Members returned after the commencement of the said Act, except in so far as regarded the repeal of the declaration against transubstantiation; And that Mr. O’Connell must withdraw unless he were prepared to take the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, and Abjuration. Whereupon Mr. O’Connell withdrew. Motion, That Mr. O’Connell be called back and heard at the table. Debate arising, a Member stated that he was requested by Mr. O’Connell to desire that he might be heard. Debate adjourned. Resolved, That Mr. O’Connell, the Member for Clare, be heard at the bar, by himself, his counsel or agents, in respect of his claim to sit and vote in Parliament without taking the Oath of Supremacy. Mr. O’Connell was called in and heard accordingly: and being withdrawn; Resolved, That it is the opinion of this House that Mr. O’Connell, having been returned a Member of this House before the commencement of the Act passed in this Session of Parliament ‘for the relief of His Majesty’s Roman Catholic subjects,’ is not entitled to sit or vote in this House unless he first take the Oath of Supremacy. Ordered, That Mr. O’Connell do attend the House this day, and that Mr. Speaker do then communicate to him the said resolution, and ask him whether he will take the Oath of Supremacy. And the House being informed that Mr. O’Connell attended at the door, he was called to the Bar, and Mr. Speaker communicated to him the resolution of the House of yesterday, and the order thereon, as followeth.” Then the resolution and the order are repeated. “And then Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the said order, asked Mr. O’Connell whether he would take the said Oath of Supremacy? Whereupon Mr. O’Connell requested to see the said Oath, which being shown to him accordingly, Mr. O’Connell stated that the said Oath contained one proposition which he knew to be false, and another proposition which he believed to be untrue; and that he therefore refused to take the said Oath of Supremacy. And then Mr. O’Connell was directed to withdraw, and he withdrew accordingly;” and then a new writ was ordered.
24. Mr. John Bright: Were those oaths separate oaths? – Yes, they were three separate oaths.
25. And they require three separate acts in taking them? – Yes.
26. Mr. Attorney General: I think the result is that the House first determined that the Oath of Supremacy which ought to be taken by Mr. O’Connell was the old oath, and not the oath under the Catholic Relief Act? – Clearly.
27. And having determined that it was the old oath that required to be taken, Mr. O’Connell refused to take it? – Certainly.
28. Mr. Bradlaugh (through the Committee): Have you searched for any precedent affecting the taking of the oath by a Member alleged to be disqualified or ineligible; has your attention been called to the case of John Horne Tooke, in Volume 35 of Parliamentary History, in the year 1801, commencing at page 956? – Not in respect of any question relating to oaths: it is not amongst these precedents.
29. As a fact, was Mr. John Horne Tooke’s capacity to sit in the House challenged in this case? – Yes, as being in Holy Orders, but not in relation to any question of taking the oath.
30. The next question that I have to ask is whether your attention has been called to the case of the alleged ineligibility of Francis Bacon, the King’s Attorney General, in 1614, cited in the Commons Journal, Volume I., pp. 459 and 460? – No, my attention has not been directed to any questions of incapacity: it has been confined to questions arising out of the taking of the oaths prescribed by law.
31. There is one other question that I should like to ask, and that is whether your attention has been called to any case in which the House has discussed and dealt with the election of a Member, before that Committee was sworn? – With regard to the Jews, that would apply to Baron Rothschild and to Alderman Salomons.
32. I do not mean a case of a Member refusing to be sworn, but a case in which the House has dealt with the election before the Member had been sworn; has your attention been called to that? – No.
33. There is one case, the case of John Wilkes; the cases of O’Donovan Rossa and Mitchell were cases of legal disability; has your attention been called to any case in which the House has dealt with the election of a Member before he was sworn except for statutory disability? – Sir John Leedes sat in the House without having taken the Oath, and therefore he had clearly vacated his seat, and a new writ was issued.
34. I mean a case in which the Member has not been sworn, and in which there has been a discussion upon his eligibility outside the precedents which you have handed in; I refer to the case of John Wilkes, which is to be found in 38 Commons Journals, p. 977, and Cavendish’s Parliamentary Debates, Volume I., extending over many hundred pages, commencing at 827. May I ask Sir Erskine May whether the practice has not been that when a Member appears to take the Oaths within the limited time, all other business is immediately to cease and not to be resumed until he has sworn and has subscribed the roll? – That was the old practice, but it has been superseded by a recent Standing Order under the Parliamentary Oaths Act of 1866, and the rule is now different; Members can be sworn until the commencement of public business and afterwards; but no debate or business may be interrupted for that purpose.
35. That is not quite the question that I wish to put; the question that I wish to put is whether it is not now and has not always been the practice of the House that within a limited time, whatever that time may be, if a Member appears to take the oaths all other business is immediately to cease and not to be resumed until he has been sworn and has subscribed the Roll? – That was the old practice, when the oaths were required to be taken before four o’clock, but it has since been altered. This is the present Standing Order under which the oaths are administered, and this order was made in pursuance of the Parliamentary Oaths Act of 1866: “That Members may take and subscribe the Oath required by law at any time during the sitting of the House before the Orders of the Day and Notices of Motions have been entered upon, or after they have been disposed of, but no debate or business shall be interrupted for that purpose.”
